Near-Rationality and Inflation in Two Monetary Regimes by Laurence Ball




I am grateful for research assistance from Qiming Chen, Julie
Smith, Martin Sommer, and Rebecca Zarutskie, and for suggestions
from Todd Clark, Jeffrey Fuhrer, Mark Gertler, Peter Ireland, N.
Gregory Mankiw, Edward Nelson, Adrian Pagan, John Roberts, John
Shea, and numerous seminar participants.  I completed this paper
as a Houblon-Norman Fellow at the Bank of England.ABSTRACT
Sticky-price models with rational expectations fail to
capture the inertia in U.S. inflation.  Models with
backward-looking expectations capture current inflation
behavior, but are unlikely to fit other monetary regimes.
This paper seeks to overcome these problems with a near-
rational model of expectations.  In the model, agents make
univariate forecasts of inflation: they use information on
past inflation optimally, but they ignore other variables.
The paper tests sticky-price models with near-rational
expectations for two periods in U.S. history, the post-1960
period of persistent inflation and the period from 1879 to
1914, when inflation was not persistent.  The models fit
the data for both periods; in contrast, both rational-





          How can we explain the short-run behavior of output and 
inflation?  Since Fischer (1978), many researchers have sought to 
do so with models that combine nominal price stickiness and 
rational expectations.  Currently, the most popular models of this 
kind are Taylor’s (1980) and Calvo’s (1983) models of staggered 
price adjustment.  Unfortunately, recent work shows that these 
models fail to fit key facts about the macroeconomy. In particular, 
the models are inconsistent with the inertia in real-world 
inflation -- the persistent effects of shocks to inflation, and the 
output costs of reducing inflation (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; 
Roberts, 1998; Mankiw, 2000).  
     In searching for better models, some authors suggest relaxing 
the assumption of rational expectations.  They argue that some or 
all agents have "backward-looking" expectations: expected inflation 
equals past inflation (e.g. Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1997; Rudebusch 
and Svensson, 1999).  Roberts (1998) and Fuhrer (1998) show that 
the canonical staggered-price-setting model fits the data much 
better when backward-looking behavior is introduced.  However, 
backward-looking models were rejected in the 1970s for a good 
reason: the Lucas (1976) critique.  While the models fit the 
behavior of inflation in the current monetary regime, expectations 
are likely to change if monetary policy changes.  Therefore, 
backward-looking models produce misleading predictions about the 
effects of policy shifts.  
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     Thus researchers face a dilemma: rational-expectations models 
fail to fit key facts, but backward-looking models are subject to 
the Lucas critique.  This paper looks for a solution to this 
dilemma.  I propose a less-than-fully-rational model of 
expectations that is applicable to any monetary regime.  The 
deviation from rationality is that agents use only a limited set of 
information to forecast future variables.  Specifically, in 
forecasting inflation, they use only the past behavior of 
inflation.  They use this univariate information optimally, but 
they do not use information on other variables, such as output or 
interest rates.  Following Akerlof and Yellen (1985a), I interpret 
this behavior as a "near-rational" approach to forecasting that 
reduces the costs of gathering and processing information. 
     For the postwar United States, my assumption is close to the 
assumption of backward-looking expectations.  For this period, the 
univariate behavior of inflation is close to a random walk; thus 
lagged inflation is close to an optimal univariate forecast of 
inflation.  However, my model does not assume that backward-looking 
expectations are a fixed feature of the economy.  In other monetary 
regimes, the univariate process for inflation can differ greatly 
from a random walk.  In such regimes, expected inflation differs 
greatly from lagged inflation. 
     After discussing alternative theories of expectations, I embed 
the theories in simple sticky-price models and test their 
implications. Since the goal is to capture shifts in behavior  
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across regimes, I test the models using data from two different 
periods in U.S. history.  The first is the period from 1960 to the 
present, when inflation has been highly persistent.  The second is 
the period from 1879 through 1914, when the U.S. had a gold 
standard.  In that period, the univariate process for inflation was 
close to white noise.  As a result, my assumption of univariate 
forecasts implies that expected inflation was close to a constant. 
     Like previous researchers, I find that sticky-price models 
fail badly at fitting the data under the assumption of rational 
expectations.  For the post-1960 period, the assumption of 
backward-looking expectations fits the data well, again as others 
have found, but this result does not carry over to the period 
before 1914.  Models with backward-looking expectations imply 
persistent effects of inflationary shocks that do not exist in the 
pre-1914 data.  In contrast to these failures, my new assumption of 
optimal univariate expectations performs well for both historical 
periods.  With these expectations, sticky-price models fit both the 
inflation persistence in the later period and the lack of 
persistence in the earlier period. 
     The rest of this paper contains seven sections.  Section II  
discusses current models of expectations and Section III proposes 
my new approach.  Section IV discusses the two historical periods 
that I study, Section V describes my sticky-price models, and 




II. INFLATION INERTIA AND CURRENT MODELS OF EXPECTATIONS 
     A. The Taylor-Calvo Model with Rational Expectations  
     Since the 1970s, most researchers studying inflation dynamics 
have used models with rational expectations.  To capture the 
interactions of inflation and output, they often assume frictions 
in wage- and price-setting.  In recent years, many researchers have 
converged on a particular specification: the Taylor-Calvo model of 
staggered price adjustment and the "New Keynesian Phillips curve" 
that it implies (Roberts, 1995). Goodfriend and King (1997) argue 
that the Taylor-Calvo model with rational expectations is part of a 
"new synthesis" in macroeconomics, and the model has become a 
standard tool for analyzing alternative monetary policies (e.g. 
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; McCallum and Nelson, 1999). 
          Unfortunately, recent research shows that the Taylor-Calvo 
model fails to capture a central feature of the modern economy: 
inflation inertia.  For the postwar United States, there is strong 
evidence that shocks to inflation have persistent effects, and 
reducing inflation requires substantial output losses (e.g. 
Christiano et al., 1994; Romer and Romer, 1989; Ball, 1994). Recent 
authors use a variety of techniques to show that the Taylor-Calvo 
model cannot fit these facts if one assumes rational expectations. 
For example, Gali and Gertler (1999) show that the model produces a 
perverse Phillips curve: higher output leads to a fall in 
inflation.  Similarly, Mankiw (2000) shows that the model produces 
implausible responses to monetary shocks, with output and inflation  
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moving in opposite directions.  These counterfactual predictions 
make the model an unreliable tool for policy analysis.  
     Of course, what the data reject is the combination of rational 
expectations with the particular specifications of price setting 
chosen by Taylor and Calvo.  In principle, the Taylor-Calvo model 
might be modified to make it fit the data under rational 
expectations.   Researchers such as Fuhrer and Moore (1995), 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and Gali and Gertler explore 
variations on the model.  However, no consensus has emerged on 
whether these variations are successful in fitting the facts.  Thus 
other researchers, and this paper, take a different approach: 
relaxing the assumption of rational expectations. 
     B. Backward-Looking Expectations 
     Until  the  1970s,  the  standard  model  of  expectations  was 
backward-looking: expected inflation was assumed to equal lagged 
inflation (or an average of several lags).  Given the empirical 
failures of rational-expectations models, some researchers have 
suggested a return to backward-looking models, or models with both 
backward-looking and rational agents (e.g. Ball, 1991; Roberts, 
1997).  Backward-looking behavior helps explain inflation inertia: 
since firms choose prices based on expected inflation, backward-
looking expectations make inflation depend on lagged inflation. 
Roberts (1998) shows that the Taylor-Calvo model fits the data much 
better when he assumes that some price setters are backward-looking 
than when he assumes rational expectations for all.  
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     But  can  one  justify  the  assumption  of  backward-looking 
expectations theoretically?  If we examine only the postwar United 
States, the answer is yes.  In recent decades, the persistence of 
inflation has been strong enough that current inflation is a fairly 
good predictor of future inflation. Inflation usually changes 
slowly, and the occasional large changes are often the result of 
unforecastable shocks, such as OPEC price rises.  Consequently, 
backward-looking inflation forecasts are not much worse than 
forecasts that use information optimally. 
     This reasoning suggests that we can interpret backward-looking 
expectations as a "near-rational rule of thumb" (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1985a).  It is costly to gather and process the information 
needed for fully rational inflation forecasts.  Some large firms 
pay these costs -- they hire economists to build forecasting models 
and monitor the Fed.  For the local pizza parlor, however, the 
costs of these activities are larger than the gains from improved 
inflation forecasts.  So the pizza parlor uses the inexpensive and 
reasonably accurate rule of setting expected inflation equal to 
past inflation.  This justification for near-rational inflation 
forecasting parallels justifications for near-rational behavior in 
price adjustment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985b) and in consumption 
(Cochrane, 1989). 
     The empirical results below support the view that backward-
looking expectations are near-rational in the current regime. If 
one forecasts inflation to equal past inflation, the forecast error  
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is simply the change in inflation.  For annual data on the GDP 
deflator from 1960-99, the standard deviation of inflation changes 
is 1.16 percentage points.  If one forecasts inflation over 1960-99 
with a vector autoregression including output, inflation, and a 
short-term interest rate, the standard error of the forecasts is 
0.84 percentage points.  Thus a substantial increase in the 
sophistication of forecasts reduces the typical error by only a few 
tenths of a percentage point.  This improvement gives firms little 
incentive to abandon backward-looking expectations. 
     C. The Lucas Critique 
     A limitation of the preceding argument is that it relies on a 
feature of the economy -- the persistence of inflation -- that 
arises in a particular monetary regime.  In other possible regimes, 
inflation would not be persistent, and so backward-looking 
expectations would be far from rational.  For example, if the 
Federal Reserve adopted a strict price-level target, inflation 
would have negative serial correlation, because policy would 
reverse deviations from the target.  In such a regime, the 
expectation that inflation will equal past inflation would be 
obviously unreasonable, and would produce large forecast errors. 
Firms with backward-looking expectations would have strong 
incentives to change their behavior.   
          This idea is more than a theoretical possibility.  The 
inflation persistence in the postwar United States does not extend 
to earlier historical periods.  In particular, the serial  
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correlation of inflation in the decades before 1914 is close to 
zero (Barsky, 1987).  As documented below, this fact implies that 
backward-looking expectations produce large forecast errors for 
that period.  The pre-1914 behavior of expectations is likely to 
differ from its recent behavior, leading to different inflation 
dynamics.  This idea is supported by evidence that pre-1914 
Phillips curves have smaller coefficients on lagged inflation than 
postwar Phillips curves (Gordon, 1980; Alogoskoufis and Smith, 
1991). 
          Because of the Lucas Critique, it is dangerous to assume 
backward-looking expectations when comparing different monetary 
regimes.  The usual response to this problem is to assume rational 
expectations -- but in models of inflation dynamics, this 
assumption produces unrealistic predictions about the current 
regime.  We need a new model of expectations that fits the current 
period and also makes plausible predictions about other regimes. 
 
III. OPTIMAL UNIVARIATE EXPECTATIONS 
     What is the right near-rational model of expectations? There 
is inevitably some arbitrariness in answering this question.  Part 
of the appeal of rational expectations is that it has an 
unambiguous definition.  When one relaxes this assumption, 
rationality can fail in many ways -- agents can ignore various 
pieces of information, or make various systematic errors.  (To 
paraphrase Tolstoy, all rational models are rational in the same  
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way, but every non-rational model is non-rational in a different 
way.)  One can imagine a deep theory of information gathering and 
processing that predicts deviations from rationality, but research 
in this area is in its infancy (e.g. Sargent, 1993).  The best one 
can do at present is to propose plausible but ad hoc types of 
behavior and see whether they fit the data.
1 
     This paper examines one type of near-rational behavior.  I 
assume that agents predicting inflation make optimal univariate 
forecasts.  The deviation from rationality is the fact that 
forecasts are univariate: agents ignore relevant variables such as 
output and interest rates.  Aside from this limitation, agents’ 
forecasts are optimal: they use inflation data as best they can. 
Metaphorically, one can imagine firms who use Box-Jenkins 
techniques to select an ARIMA model for inflation, but who do not 
go to the added trouble of using multivariate techniques. 
     The justification for this behavior is the same as the earlier 
justification for backward-looking expectations: univariate 
forecasting is a near-rational rule of thumb.  It economizes on 
information costs because it requires examining only a single, 
obvious variable, and it produces forecast errors only modestly 
larger than fully rational expectations.  Here, however, the 
justification is not specific to a particular monetary regime.  In 
                                                 
1 As Sargent puts it, "when we withdraw the assumption of a commonly 
understood environment, we have to replace it with something, and 
there are so many plausible possibilities.  Ironically, when we 
economists make the people in our models more "bounded" in their 
rationality...we must be smarter...." (p. 2).   
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my model, expectations adjust to changes in the univariate 
inflation process, allowing them to remain near-rational.  In 
particular, I show below that univariate expectations are close to 
rational in both the post-1960 and pre-1914 periods.  
     My model of expectations has many antecedents.  In the early 
days of rational expectations, Sargent (1973) and McCallum (1976) 
discussed the idea that expectations might be based on univariate 
forecasts, calling this model "partly rational expectations."   
McCallum suggests that lagged inflation rates are the variables 
"most likely to be considered by market participants" in 
forecasting inflation.  More recently, applied researchers such as 
Staiger et al. (1997) use univariate forecasts as proxies for 
expected inflation when estimating Phillips curves. 
     At a broader level, I follow a number of authors who seek to 
explain inflation behavior with deviations from rationality. For 
example, "bounded rationality" is central to Sargent’s recent 
interpretation of U.S. inflation history (although Sargent 
emphasizes bounded rationality on the part of policymakers rather 
than private agents).  Lucas’s (1973) model of the Phillips curve 
is another inspiration for my work, although Lucas calls the 
friction in his model "imperfect information" rather than near-
rationality.  In both Lucas's model and mine, agents ignore certain 
observable variables -- in his case, they ignore the price level in 
estimating relative prices -- but they use the information they do  
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collect optimally.  Thus my model builds on a theme that is common 
to such diverse researchers as Lucas, Sargent, and Akerlof-Yellen. 
     Since my model is just one kind of near-rational expectations, 
future research should explore others.  One can imagine 
expectations that are closer to full rationality; for example, 
agents might use data on output as well as inflation to forecast 
future inflation, while still ignoring interest rates. Or 
expectations could be farther from rationality; agents might use 
AR-1 models of inflation rather than optimal ARIMA models. A 
generalization of my model might include a mixture of fully-
rational and less-than-rational agents, following Roberts (1997) 
and others.  Future work can ask which variation on near-
rationality best captures the behavior of inflation. 
 
IV. EXPECTATIONS IN TWO MONETARY REGIMES 
     In Sections VI and VII below, I test macroeconomic models with 
univariate expectations in two historical periods.  As preliminary 
steps, this section describes the two periods and presents evidence 
on what kinds of expectations are near-rational in each of them. 
     A. The Two Periods    
     The first period I examine is the current regime of highly 
persistent inflation, which I date from 1960 through the present 
(my data end in 1999).  Some authors consider the entire period 
since World War II, but Barsky (1987) finds that strong inflation 
persistence emerged only around 1960.  For the post-1960 period,  
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Barsky and others find that the process for inflation has a unit 
root.  A common interpretation is that policy has accomodated 
shocks to inflation, leading the shocks to have permanent effects. 
          For annual data on the GDP deflator, an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test confirms the finding of a unit root in inflation over 
1960-1999.  Therefore, I construct inflation forecasts with a 
stationary model for the change in inflation ( ).  For annual 
data, I assume that the univariate behavior of   can be 
approximated by an AR-2 process.  Table I reports OLS estimates of 
the AR coefficients.  Both coefficients are statistically 
significant but modest in size.  The small coefficients confirm 
that inflation is fairly close to a pure random walk.
2 
     The other period I examine is the gold-standard era from 1879 
through 1914.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that there were 
important regime shifts in 1879, when the U.S. returned to the gold 
standard, and in 1914, when the Federal Reserve was established. As 
discussed above, previous work finds that inflation was close to 
white noise during this period -- the price level was close to a 
random walk.  Shocks such as gold discoveries and shifts in money 
demand produced one-time changes in the price level. 
     I reexamine the inflation process for 1879-1914 using the two 
leading series for the output deflator, those of Balke and Gordon 
(1989) and Romer (1989).  For each series, Table I reports 
                                                 
2 I do not include a constant in the model for ∆π .  This means I 




estimates of AR-2 models for the level of inflation. All the 
coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, confirming 
that inflation was close to white noise.  The constant in the 
equation is also close to zero, implying that the univariate 
forecast of inflation is close to zero in all years. 
    In the empirical work below, I assume that the periods 1960-99 
and 1879-1914 are stable monetary regimes, and that price setters 
know the univariate inflation process in each period. The 
assumption of stable regimes appears reasonable.  Some authors 
suggest that there were regime shifts in 1979 (the Volcker 
appointment and change in operating procedures) or 1986 (when 
Taylor’s (1993) interest-rate rule begins to fit the data). 
However, Chow tests based on these dates fail to reject a stable 
inflation process over 1960-1999 (p=0.20 for 1979 and p=0.77 for 
1986). 
     Even if the inflation process is stable, it is questionable to 
assume that agents know the process throughout the regime. This 
assumption is weaker than the usual rational-expectations 
hypothesis, in which agents know the entire structure of the 
economy.  However, as stressed by Sargent (1999), agents are not 
endowed with a priori knowledge of inflation behavior.  Instead, 
they must learn about it over time, perhaps by reestimating the 
inflation process as new data arrive.  Future work should combine 
this idea about learning with my idea of limited information sets. 
One could assume, for example, that expectations are determined by  
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real-time estimates of the univariate inflation process rather than 
the true process.    
     B. What Expectations Are Near-Rational? 
     I argue above that optimal univariate forecasts are a near-
rational form of expectations in many monetary regimes.  In 
contrast, backward-looking expectations are near-rational only if 
inflation is highly persistent.  Here I confirm these ideas by 
computing forecast errors for various kinds of expectations. 
          As a benchmark, I first compute errors based on optimal 
multivariate forecasts.  For both the pre-1914 and post-1960 
periods, I forecast annual inflation based on lags of inflation, 
output, and a short-term interest rate.  Output is defined as 
detrended real GNP (for the early period) or GDP (for the later 
period); the trend is measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter with 
smoothing parameter 1000.  Inflation is the percentage change in 
the GNP or GDP deflator.  For the early period, output and 
inflation data are taken from both Romer and Balke-Gordon. The 
interest rate for the later period is the Treasury bill rate; for 
the early period it is the commercial paper rate from the NBER 
Macro History Database. 
     As discussed above, inflation appears to be non-stationary for 
the post-1960 period.  Following Roberts (1998), I assume that the 
nominal interest rate is also non-stationary, and that the real 
interest rate, r=i- , is stationary.  (Equivalently, i and   are 
cointegrated).  For the post-1960 period, I forecast inflation by  
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regressing the change in inflation on lags of the stationary 
variables y,  , and r.  For the pre-1914 period, I regress 
inflation on y,  , and i.  For each period, I include two lags of 
all variables. 
     Table II presents the standard errors of these multivariate 
forecasting equations.  For the post-1960 period, the standard 
error is 0.84.  For the pre-1914 period, the standard error is 2.10 
for the Balke-Gordon data and 3.26 for the Romer data, reflecting 
greater inflation variability in the earlier period. 
     Table  II  also  reproduces  the  standard  errors  of  optimal 
univariate forecasts from Table I.  These exceed the errors from 
multivariate forecasts by only a few tenths of a percentage point: 
the increase is 0.25 percentage points in the post-1960 period, and 
0.30 and 0.15 for the two pre-1914 data sets.  Note that output and 
interest rates usually do make some contribution to forecasting 
inflation: in the multivariate equations, these variables are 
jointly significant for the post-1960 data (p<0.01) and for the 
Balke-Gordon version of the pre-1914 data (p=0.02).  But the size 
of the forecast improvements from adding these variables is modest, 
making it plausible that near-rational agents would ignore them.  
     Finally,  Table  II  presents  standard  errors  for  backward-
looking expectations,  t
e= t-1.  As discussed in Section II, these are 
not much larger than multivariate forecast errors for the post-1960 
period.  But in the pre-1914 period, errors for backward-looking 
expectations exceed errors for multivariate forecasts by 1.02  
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percentage points in the Balke-Gordon data and 1.36 points in the 
Romer data.  These increases in standard errors are much larger 
than the increases from using univariate forecasts.  These findings 
confirm that backward-looking expectations are far from rational in 
the pre-1914 period. 
 
V.  MODELS OF PRICE SETTING 
     This section describes two models of price adjustment, which I 
go on to test under alternative assumptions about expectations. 
Both models are based on the canonical macroeconomic model of 
imperfect competition (Romer, 1996, ch. 6), but they differ in the 
timing of price changes.  The first model follows Taylor (1979): I 
assume that each firm sets its price for two periods, and that 
adjustment is staggered across firms.  In the second model, each 
firm adjusts its price every period.  In this case, nominal 
rigidity arises because some firms set prices before observing the 
current state. 
     The model with staggered adjustment has the advantage that 
much recent research uses similar models; thus my tests of this 
model are directly comparable to previous work.  For my purposes, 
however, the model with staggering also has a major drawback: 
estimating it requires data at greater than an annual frequency. 
The reason, as detailed below, is that a plausible calibration sets 
a period in the model equal to half a year. Unfortunately, only 












1 − + = t t t x x p
, 0 ,
* > + = v y v p p t t t
therefore use my second price-adjustment model, which requires only 
annual data, to compare the pre-1914 and post-1960 periods. 
     A. The Model with Staggered Adjustment 
     The economy contains a large number of imperfectly competitive 
firms.  Each firm’s desired price in period t is given by 
  (1) 
where p* is the desired nominal price, p is the aggregate price 
level, and y is aggregate output (all variables are in logs). 
Equation (1) can be derived from profit-maximization when firms 
have isoelastic cost and demand functions (Romer, ch. 6). 
Intuitively, a rise in output shifts out each firm's demand curve, 
raising its desired relative price. 
     In this version of the model, a firm sets a fixed price for 
two periods.  Let xt denote the price set by firms in period t for t 
and t+1.  This price is chosen after firms observe the state of the 
economy at t.  Following Taylor (1979) and Roberts (1995), firms 
set xt equal to the average of expected optimal prices at t and t+1: 
   (2)       
where Et denotes firms' expectations at time t.  Note that Et may or 
may not equal a mathematical expectation, depending on whether we 
assume rational expectations. 
     Price  setting  is  staggered,  with  equal  numbers  of  firms 
adjusting each period.  Thus the price level pt is the average of xt 
and xt-1: 
   (3)      
 
18




tt t t t t t t t t t t
v
EE y E y y E y ππ π ε +− +−− =+ + + + + +
As shown by Roberts (1995), equations (1)-(3) and algebra yield an 
equation for inflation, π t ≡  pt - pt-1: 
   (4)  
where I add an error ε t to capture inflation shocks not explained by 
the model.  I assume that ε t is serially uncorrelated and 
uncorrelated with yt.  
          Equation (4) is one version of the popular "New Keynesian 
Phillips curve."  According to the equation, inflation depends on 
expected inflation in the current and future periods, and on output 
terms.  The empirical work below examines the performance of this 
equation.
3 
     B. The Model with Prices Set for One Period 
     In the second model of price adjustment, firms’ desired prices 
are again given by equation (1).  Each firm sets its price one 
period at a time.  A fraction w of firms, the "sticky-price" 
                                                 
3  Equation (4) is similar to equation (8) in Roberts (1995).   
Roberts, however, writes the equation differently.  He replaces the 
term Et-1π t with π t + ut, where ut is an expectational error (ut ≡  Et-1π t 
- π t).  Making this substitution and rearranging leads to 
 
   (4’)      π t = Etπ t+1 + v (yt + Etyt+1 + yt-1 + Et-1yt) + 2 ε t + ut . 
 
Here, the only inflation expectation that appears explicitly is 
Etπ t+1 - the Phillips curve appears to be fully "forward-looking." 
But Et-1π t enters the equation through the error ut.  (This result 
depends on Taylor’s assumption of fixed intervals between price 
adjustments.  As shown by Roberts, Calvo’s assumption of random 
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sector, must set prices one period in advance.  They set their 
prices equal to the expected optimal price:  
   (5)    
The other firms, the "flexible-price" sector, set prices after 
observing the current state.  Their prices are 
   (6)    
I include the flexible-price sector to allow output to have some 
effect on inflation within a period.       
     The aggregate price level is a weighted average of p
s and p
f: 
   (7)    
This equation and (1), (5), and (6) lead to  
   (8)    
Subtracting pt-1 from each side yields another Phillips curve: 
   (9)    
where I again add an error ε t.  This equation is similar in spirit 
to the earlier Phillips curve: inflation depends on expected 
inflation and output terms.  However, the dynamic structure is 
simpler than before.  
 
VI.  TESTING THE MODEL WITH STAGGERING 
     The rest of this paper examines the empirical performance of 
my sticky-price models under rational expectations, backward-
looking expectations, and optimal univariate expectations.  In this 
section, I embed these expectational assumptions in the model with 
staggered price adjustment.  
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     In calibrating the model, a key parameter is the frequency of 
price adjustment.  Following Fuhrer-Moore and Roberts, I assume 
that each firm adjusts once per year.  This assumption is 
consistent with the finding that the median U.S. firm adjusts at 
this frequency (Blinder et al., 1998).  Since a firm in the 
staggering model adjusts every two periods, annual adjustment means 
a period is interpreted as half a year.  I therefore estimate the 
model with semi-annual data, which are available only for the post-
1960 period.
4      
     A. The Model with Rational Expectations 
     A number of previous authors test my model of staggered price 
adjustment (or similar models) under the assumption of rational 
expectations.  These tests usually produce strong rejections (e.g. 
Estrella and Fuhrer, 1998; Mankiw, 2000).  Gali and Gertler (1999) 
present an especially simple demonstration of the model’s failure. 
They estimate the model’s Phillips curve, equation (4), and obtain 
a negative coefficient on the output term; this result contradicts 
the underlying theory.  Here I assume rational expectations and 
replicate Gali and Gertler’s negative result. This exercise 
provides a benchmark when I examine the model’s performance with 
other kinds of expectations. 
                                                 
4  In this section, the inflation and interest rate variables are the 
semi-annual analogues of the variables defined in Section IV. To 
obtain the output gap, I detrend quarterly output with the HP 
filter (λ =16,000) and then aggregate the quarterly gap series.  
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          To estimate equation (4), I first replace all expected 
variables with actual variables plus expectational errors.  This 
yields 
   (10)  
where ut is an expectational error (ut ≡  (1/2) (Et-1π t-π t) + (v/2) (Et-1yt -
yt)).  Note there are two expectational errors, ut and ut+1, because 
equation (4) includes expectations of variables at t and t+1.   
Equation (10) simplifies to 
   (11) 
          The parameter v in (11) can be estimated by instrumental 
variables.  As instruments, I use the output gap, the change in 
inflation, and the real interest rate from t-1 through t-4.  Under 
rational expectations, these lagged variables are uncorrelated with 
the expectational errors ut and ut+1.  They are also uncorrelated 
with the white-noise error ε t in the underlying inflation equation. 
     The instrumental variables estimate of v is -0.049, with a 
Newey-West standard error of 0.016.  Thus the estimate is 
significantly negative.  Recall that v is the effect of output on 
firms’ desired prices in equation (1).  The model of monopolistic 
competition underlying (1) implies that v is positive.  Thus, like 
Gali and Gertler, I find that the estimate of v contradicts theory. 
     There  is  a  straightforward  explanation  for  the  model’s 
failure.  For v>0, equation (11) gives a positive relation between 
π t-π t+1 and an average of output from t-1 to t+1.  π t-π t+1 equals -∆π t+1, 
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inflation.  In the data, however, there is a positive relation 
between output and ∆π t+1 -- the accelerationist Phillips curve.  This 
contradiction between the model’s Phillips curve and the one in the 
data produces the model’s rejection. 
     B. The Model with Optimal Univariate Expectations 
          I now show that the model of staggered price adjustment 
performs better if rational expectations are replaced by optimal 
univariate expectations.  As a first step, I reestimate the model’s 
Phillips curve, equation (4), and show that the parameter v has the 
correct sign. 
     In this version of the model, I replace the expected inflation 
terms in equation (4) with optimal univariate forecasts.  For 
consistency, I assume that output expectations are also given by 
univariate forecasts.  Semi-annual inflation forecasts are 
generated by an AR-4 model for ∆π  with coefficients ρ 1,..,ρ 4; output 
forecasts are generated by an AR-4 with coefficients β 1,...,β 4. 
These assumptions determine the expectations in (4) in terms of the 
AR parameters and current and lagged variables. For example, Etπ t+1 
equals  π t+ρ 1(∆π )t+...+ρ 4(∆π )t-3. Substituting expressions like this 
into (4) leads, after algebra, to 





     To estimate this equation, I first estimate the AR processes 
for  ∆π  and y and substitute the estimates of ρ ’s and β ’s into 
equation (12).  With the AR coefficients replaced by numbers, (12) 
has a single parameter, v.  I can estimate v by ordinary least 
squares, since the error ε  is uncorrelated with output and its own 
lags.  The estimate of v is 0.058 with a standard error of 0.014.
5 
     Thus, in contrast to the case of rational expectations, the 
estimated v has the positive sign predicted by theory.  To 
understand why, recall that inflation is close to a random walk in 
the post-1960 period; thus, with univariate forecasts, Et-1π t is 
close to π t-1.  Roberts and others have shown that replacing Et-1π t 
with  π t-1 helps staggered-price-setting models fit the data. 
Specifically, if this substitution is made in equation (4), the 
equation reduces to a positive relation between ∆π  and output - the 
Phillips curve that appears in the data. 
                                                 
5   The estimated parameters substituted into equation (12) are 
ρ 1=0.029,  ρ 2=0.049,  ρ 3=-0.084,  ρ 4=-0.099, β 1=1.237, β 2=-0.476, β 3=-
0.114, and β 4=0.068.  In principle, my use of generated coefficients 
makes the OLS standard error for v invalid (Pagan, 1984). My 
problem is sufficiently non-standard that it is difficult to 
generate the correct standard error. However, Monte Carlo evidence 
suggests that the OLS standard error is close to correct in this 
application.  I generate artificial data that mimic the output-
inflation dynamics in the true data using a VAR for y and ∆π  and 
bootstrap techniques.  I create 50,000 artificial data sets, each 
the same size as the true data set (80 observations). For each 
artificial sample, I estimate v using my two-step procedure.  The 
standard deviation of the estimated v’s across samples is 0.015. 




     Obtaining  a  coefficient  estimate  with  the  correct  sign  is 
fairly weak confirmation of a model.  I can, however, construct a 
stronger test of the model’s quantitative implications.  To do so, 
I first summarize the inflation-output interactions in the data by 
estimating an unrestricted, atheoretical Phillips curve. 
Specifically, I regress the change in inflation on four lags of 
itself, current output, and four lags of output; then I transform 
the results to obtain an equation for the level of inflation.  The 
first column of Table III reports coefficient estimates and 
standard errors for this equation.  (Once again, I estimate an 
equation for ∆π  because inflation is non-stationary.) 
     In equation (12), moving the lagged-inflation terms to the 
right side yields a restricted version of the atheoretical Phillips 
curve.  Once the estimated ρ ’s and β ’s are substituted in, the 
coefficients on all the output and inflation lags are determined by 
one parameter, v.  The second column of Table III gives the 
coefficients that arise when v is set at its OLS estimate of 0.058. 
To test the model, I test the hypothesis that all the coefficients 
in the unrestricted Phillips curve equal their values in the 
restricted Phillips curve.
6 
          An F-test fails to reject the equality of restricted and 
unrestricted coefficients (p=0.66).  Most important, Table III 
                                                 
6 This test treats the coefficients in the restricted equation as 
constants; it ignores sampling error in estimating these 
coefficients.  This appears to bias the test toward rejection of 
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shows that the two sets of coefficients are close in economic 
terms.  In both cases, the first inflation lag has a coefficient 
near one and the longer lags have coefficients near zero.  And in 
both cases, there are positive coefficients on current output and 
one or two output lags.  The sum of output coefficients is 0.25 in 
the unrestricted equation and 0.21 in the restricted equation. Thus 
the Phillips curve derived from the model is consistent with the 
stylized facts. 
     C. The Model with Backward-Looking Expectations 
     The final version of the staggered-adjustment model assumes 
backward-looking expectations: Et-1π t=π t-1.  The results for this case 
are similar to the results for optimal univariate expectations. 
This reflects the fact that the two models of expectations are 
nearly equivalent for the post-1960 period. 
     In equation (4), I substitute π t-1 for Et-1π t and π t for Etπ t+1. I 
assume that output expectations are also backward-looking and 
substitute lagged output for expected output.  Equation (4) reduces 
to 
(13)   
The OLS estimate of the parameter v is 0.056 with a standard error 
of 0.013. 
     Equation  (13)  is  another  restricted  version  of  the 
atheoretical Phillips curve.  In Table III, the third column gives 
the Phillips-curve coefficients implied by (13) with v=0.056.  Once 
again, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the unrestricted  
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coefficients equal the restricted coefficients. And once again, the 
restricted and unrestricted equations tell the same economic story. 
Inflation depends on lagged inflation with a coefficient near one 
(or exactly one in column (3)), and on output terms. 
          I would like to test the model with backward-looking 
expectations against the model with optimal univariate forecasts. 
However, this is not practically possible with post-1960 data, 
because the models’ implications are so similar for this period. I 
therefore turn to data for the period before 1914, when the two 
kinds of expectations differ greatly. 
 
VII. TESTING THE MODEL WITH ONE-PERIOD PRICES 
          This section tests the second version of my sticky-price 
model, in which a firm adjusts its price every period.  I again 
assume that prices are adjusted once per year, which means here 
that a period is a year.  I can therefore test the model for the 
pre-1914 period, when only annual data are available, as well as 
the post-1960 period.   
     A. Rational Expectations 
     It is easy to see that the model with one-period prices is 
rejected if one assume rational expectations.  Paralleling the 
analysis in the previous section, I start with the model’s Phillips 
curve, equation (9), and replace expected variables with actual 
variables plus expectational errors.  This yields 
   (14)     
 
27
where ut ≡  Et-1π t - π t + v (Et-1yt - yt).  The π t’s cancel out, leaving 
   (15)      . 0 t t t u y
w
v
+ + = ε  
One can again estimate the output coefficient, v/w, by instrumental 
variables.  Since the left side of (15) is zero, the estimate is 
obviously zero.  This implies v=0, which contradicts the model’s 
assumption of v>0. 
     To  see  the  problem  more  intuitively,  consider  the  model’s 
implications when v>0.  In this case, equation (9) gives a positive 
relation between π t-Et-1π t and actual and expected output.  Thus 
variables that help forecast output also help forecast π t-Et-1π t. This 
result contradicts rational expectations, which implies that π t-Et-1π t 
is unforecastable. 
     These results depend, of course, on the model’s simple timing 
of price adjustment.  As shown earlier, the staggered-adjustment 
model with rational expectations produces an estimate of v which is 
negative rather than zero.  However, both a zero v and a negative v 
violate theory.  The failure of rational expectations is a robust 
result, although the failure takes different forms in the two 
price-setting models. 
     B. Optimal Univariate Expectations 
     Like the earlier model with staggering, the model with one-
period prices fits the data fairly well if one assumes optimal 
univariate expectations.  I show this is true for annual data from 
both 1960-1999 and 1879-1914.  
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     The  Model’s Phillips Curve: With annual data, I use the 
forecasting models for inflation in Table I: an AR-2 for ∆π  in the 
post-1960 period and an AR-2 for the level of π  in the pre-1914 
period.  In both periods I use an AR-2 for output to measure output 
expectations.  For each period, I substitute the forecasting models 
into equation (9) and obtain inflation in terms of lagged inflation 
and current and lagged output.  I omit these equations, which are 
the analogues of equation (12) for the model with staggering.  Once 
estimates of the AR coefficients are substituted in, there are two 
free parameters, the coefficients on Et-1yt and yt in (9).  In terms 
of underlying parameters, these coefficients equal v and (1-w)v/w.  
          Table IVA presents OLS estimates of the two output 
coefficients for the 1960-1999 and 1879-1914 periods. For the post-
1960 period, the two coefficients are positive, and they are 
jointly significant at the one percent level.  The estimates for 
1879-1914 are imprecise, especially for the Romer data, reflecting 
the high inflation variability in the period.  For both pre-1914 
data sets, the yt coefficient is positive but the Et-1yt coefficient 
is negative, contradicting theory.  However, the negative 
coefficients are far from significant, and confidence intervals 
include large positive values.  Thus the pre-1914 data neither 
reject nor strongly support the model’s predictions about output 
effects. 
     Again paralleling earlier analysis, I test the restrictions 
that the model places on an atheoretical Phillips curve.  Table IVB  
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presents unrestricted Phillips curves and the Phillips curves 
implied by equation (9) with univariate expectations. The 
coefficients in (9) are set at the estimated values in Table IVA. 
For the post-1960 period, the unrestricted equation is once again 
obtained by estimating an equation for ∆π ; for the pre-1914 period, 
I estimate an equation for π  directly. 
     One  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  unrestricted 
coefficients equal the restricted coefficients for either 1960-1999 
or 1879-1914 (the p-values are 0.3 and higher). In comparing the 
restricted and unrestricted equations, the output coefficients are 
not very informative, because they are estimated imprecisely.  The 
coefficients on inflation lags are more interesting.  For the post-
1960 data, the sum of these coefficients is close to one in both 
the restricted and unrestricted equations (as found before with 
semi-annual data). For the pre-1914 data, the sum of coefficients 
is less than 0.3 in both equations.  Thus the restricted and 
unrestricted Phillips curves shift across time in the same way. 
     Previous papers such as Gordon (1980) and Algoskoufis-Smith 
(1991) have pointed out the shift across regimes in lagged-
inflation coefficients in unrestricted Phillips curves.  As shown 
below, the success in capturing this shift is what distinguishes my 
model of univariate expectations from backward-looking 
expectations.  The reasons for the model’s behavior should be 
clear. In the model, lagged inflation rates enter the Phillips 
curve to the extent they influence univariate inflation forecasts.  
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In going from the post-1960 to the pre-1914 period, the inflation 
process becomes less persistent, so lagged inflation has smaller 
effects on forecasts.  
     Impulse Response Functions: To illustrate the performance of 
the model, I borrow a technique from Fuhrer-Moore (1995) and 
Roberts (1998): comparison of restricted and unrestricted impulse 
response functions.  I first combine the unrestricted Phillips 
curve estimated above with an equation for output in terms of 
lagged output and lagged inflation.  These two equations are a 
vector autoregression in recursive form (contemporaneous output 
affects inflation but not vice-versa). For each time period, I 
derive impulse response functions from the VAR; these summarize the 
output-inflation interactions to be explained.  
     I then replace the inflation equation in the VAR with the 
Phillips curve from my model -- equation (9) with expectations 
given by univariate forecasts.  I leave the output equation 
unchanged.  The resulting system yields impulse responses that 
embody the model’s restrictions on inflation behavior. 
     This exercise requires values for the coefficients on yt and Et-
1yt in equation (9).  For the post-1960 period, I use the point 
estimates in Table IVA.  For the pre-1914 period, recall that the 
Et-1yt coefficient is negative, violating theory, but highly 
insignificant.  For this period, I set the Et-1yt coefficient to zero 
(the lower bound of its theoretical range) and reestimate the  
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coefficient on yt.  The new yt coefficient is 0.26 for the Romer 
data and 0.11 for Balke-Gordon.
7 
     Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of inflation to output 
and inflation shocks for the post-1960 and two pre-1914 data sets. 
The solid lines in the graphs are responses derived from the 
unrestricted VAR, and the dashed lines are restricted responses. 
The graphs also show 95% confidence bands for the unrestricted 
responses, derived by bootstrap methods.  The central message of 
the Figure is that the restricted and unrestricted responses are 
similar.  In particular, the restricted responses almost always lie 
within the confidence intervals for the unrestricted responses.
8  
     Recall that pre-1914 Phillips curves have lower coefficients 
on lagged inflation than post-1960 Phillips curves. This difference 
is reflected in the persistence of inflation responses in Figure 1. 
In both periods, inflation initially rises after an output or 
inflation shock.  In the post-1960 period, inflation remains high 
permanently (although, for inflation shocks, the long-run response 
is smaller than the initial response).  In the early period, by 
contrast, the effects of shocks die out quickly.  Again, these 
results arise for both restricted and unrestricted impulse 
responses. 
                                                 
7  I have also experimented with other coefficient values.  My 
qualitative results are robust for wide ranges of values, as long 
as the coefficients on both yt and Et-1yt are non-negative. 
8 I have also computed responses of output to output and inflation 
shocks.  The restricted and unrestricted responses are very close, 
reflecting the fact that the model does not restrict the output 




     C. Backward-Looking Expectations 
     Finally,  I  examine  the  model  with  one-period  prices  under 
backward-looking expectations.  This specification fits the post-
1960 data, but it is strongly rejected for the pre-1914 period. 
     With backward-looking expectations,  I substitute π t-1 for Et-1π t 
and yt-1 for Et-1yt in equation (9).  I then estimate the equation’s 
two coefficients by OLS.  Table VA presents the coefficient 
estimates, which are similar to those for the univariate-
expectations case. 
     Again  paralleling  earlier  analysis,  Table  VB  compares  the 
Phillips curve derived from the model to an unrestricted Phillips 
curve.  The results differ sharply across time periods. The 
hypothesis that the unrestricted coefficients equal the restricted 
coefficients is not rejected for the post-1960 period, but it is 
rejected at the 99% level for both of the pre-1914 data sets.   
     These  results  are  explained  by  the  coefficients  on  lagged 
inflation in the Phillips curves.  Under backward-looking 
expectations, the first inflation lag always has a coefficient of 
one in the restricted equation.  The unrestricted Phillips curve is 
consistent with this result for the post-1960 period, but, as 
discussed before, the pre-1914 coefficient is much less than one. 
The unrestricted Phillips curve shifts in a way that is not 
captured by the backward-looking model. 
     Paralleling Figure 1, Figure 2 compares unrestricted impulse 
responses for inflation to restricted responses, derived as before  
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by replacing the VAR inflation equation with the model’s Phillips 
curve. The Figure confirms the model’s failure for the pre-1914 
period: for both the Romer and the Balke-Gordon data, the 
restricted impulse responses travel far away from the unrestricted 
responses.  Specifically, the unrestricted responses die out 
quickly but the restricted responses do not. The backward-looking 





     This paper proposes a near-rational model of expectations: 
agents make optimal univariate forecasts of inflation and output. 
This assumption helps to explain the behavior of U.S. inflation in 
two different periods, 1960-99 and 1879-1914.  In contrast, neither 
fully rational expectations nor backward-looking expectations fits 
both periods. 
     My model of expectations meets Lucas’s (1976) criterion for 
reliable policy analysis: it holds across different monetary 
regimes.  In future work, I will apply the model to normative 
questions about monetary policy, such as the choice of an 
instrument or target rule.  This analysis will account for shifts 
in expectations as new policies change the univariate behavior of 
                                                 
9 To derive the restricted impulse responses for the pre-1914 
period, I again set the coefficient on Et-1yt to zero in equation (9) 
and reestimate the coefficient on yt.  The new yt coefficient is 





output and inflation.  I hope this approach yields more credible 
results than policy analysis based on fully rational expectations 
(e.g. McCallum and Nelson, 1999) or backward-looking expectations 
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 1960-1999 1879-1914 (Balke-Gordon) 1879-1914 (Romer)
Dependent Vbl: Dp t Dependent Vbl: p t Dependent Vbl: p t
constant 0.235 0.497
(0.400) (0.572)
(Dp) t-1 0.311 p t-1 0.194 0.070
(0.152) (0.160) (0.162)
(Dp) t-2 -0.333 p t-2 -0.043 0.145
(0.151) (0.160) (0.159)
S.E.E. 1.088 S.E.E. 2.398 3.413
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Table 1: Univariate Models of Inflation1960-1999 1879-1914 1879-1914
Balke-Gordon Romer
Multivariate 0.837 2.097 3.261
Univariate 1.088 2.398 3.413
Backward-Looking 1.158 3.112 4.623
Table 2: Standard Errors of Inflation ForecastsUnrestricted Optimal Univariate Backward-Looking
Expectations Expectations
p t-1 0.821 1.080 1
(0.118)
p t-2 0.123 -0.116 0
(0.152)
p t-3 -0.051 -0.152 0
(0.149)
p t-4 0.009 0.087 0
(0.148)
p t-5 0.097 0.102 0
(0.111)
y t 0.166 0.134 0.112
(0.104)
y t-1 0.037 0.106 0.112
(0.164)
y t-2 0.095 -0.035 0
(0.147)
y t-3 -0.001 -0.003 0
(0.131)
y t-4 -0.045 0.004 0
(0.091)
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Table 3: Alternative Phillips Curves - Semi-Annual Data, 1960-1999
(Dependent Vbl: p t)1960-1999 1879-1914  1879-1914 
Balke-Gordon Romer
y t 0.125 0.146 0.416
(0.081) (0.092) (0.202)
Et-1 y t 0.237 -0.101 -0.348
(0.118) (0.159) (0.297)
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
constant 0 0 0.179 0.235 0.506 0.497
(0.366) (0.555)
p t-1 0.985 1.311 0.176 0.194 0.055 0.070
(0.158) (0.157) (0.165)
p t-2 -0.323 -0.644 0.104 -0.043 0.225 0.145
(0.204) (0.157) (0.161)
p t-3 0.338 0.333 0 0 0 0
(0.146)
y t 0.089 0.125 0.143 0.146 0.418 0.416
(0.083) (0.089) (0.209)
y t-1 0.269 0.193 0.149 -0.053 -0.050 -0.260
(0.104) (0.115) (0.286)
y t-2 0.005 -0.059 -0.285 -0.010 -0.308 0.026
(0.088) (0.101) (0.234)
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Table 4: The Model with One-Period Prices: Univariate Expectations
(Annual Data)
Part B: Phillips Curves
Part A: Coefficient Estimates
1960-1999 1879-1914  1879-1914 
Romer Balke-Gordon1960-1999 1879-1914  1879-1914 
Balke-Gordon Romer
y t 0.146 0.204 0.560
(0.081) (0.122) (0.283)
Et-1 y t 0.200 -0.222 -0.588
(0.082) (0.125) (0.291)
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
constant 0 0 0.179 0 0.506 0
(0.366) (0.555)
p t-1 0.985 1 0.176 1 0.055 1
(0.158) (0.157) (0.165)
p t-2 -0.323 0 0.104 0 0.225 0
(0.204) (0.157) (0.161)
p t-3 0.338 0 0 0 0 0
(0.146)
y t 0.089 0.146 0.143 0.204 0.418 0.560
(0.083) (0.089) (0.209)
y t-1 0.269 0.200 0.149 -0.222 -0.050 -0.588
(0.104) (0.115) (0.286)
y t-2 0.005 0 -0.285 0 -0.308 0
(0.088) (0.101) (0.234)
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Table 5: The Model with One-Period Prices: Backward-Looking Expectations
(Annual Data)
Part A: Coefficient Estimates
Part B: Phillips Curves
1960-1999 1879-1914  1879-1914 
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1960-1999 
1879-1914 (Romer) 
1879-1914 (Balke-Gordon) 
 Restricted
Unrestricted 